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Abstract—In this paper we consider a three-state variant of the
BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol. We derive a new
lower-bound on the key rate of this protocol in the asymptotic
scenario and use mismatched measurement outcomes to improve
the channel estimation. Our new key rate bound remains positive
up to an error rate of 11%, exactly that achieved by the four-state
BB84 protocol.
Index Terms—Quantum Key Distribution, Cryptography
I. INTRODUCTION
A quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol is designed to
allow two users Alice A and Bob B to establish a shared
secret key that is secure against an all powerful adversary
Eve E. Typically, these protocols operate by A preparing and
sending qubits to B who will then measure them; both the
preparation and the subsequent measurements are performed
in a variety of bases as dictated by the protocol. This quantum
communication stage results in A and B each distilling a raw
key: a string of classical bits of size N which is partially
correlated and partially secret. The users will then run an
error correcting (EC) and privacy amplification (PA) protocol
resulting in a secret key of size `(N) ≤ N . In this paper,
we are interested in the key rate in the asymptotic scenario
defined r = limN→∞
`(N)
N . See [1] for more information on
these standard definitions and processes.
It was shown in [2] that, assuming collective attacks (where
E performs the same attack operation each iteration but is
free to postpone the measurement of her ancilla to any future
time), then r = inf(S(A|E)−H(A|B)). Here S(A|E) is the
conditional von Neumann entropy; H(A|B) is the conditional
classical entropy, and the infimum is over the set of all
collective attacks which induce the observed statistics.
In this paper, we will compute a new lower bound on the
key rate of a three-state protocol first introduced in [3], [4].
Such a protocol allows A to only send |0〉, |1〉, or |+〉 (we will
actually consider a generalized version where the third state is
|a〉 = α |0〉+√1− α2 |1〉 for any α ∈ (0, 1)); thus the users
cannot measure the probability of E’s attack flipping a |−〉
to a |+〉 as can be done in the four-state BB84 [5] protocol.
However, by using mismatched measurement outcomes [6] we
can impose further restrictions on the set of possible attacks
used by E thus improving the key rate bound (in particular,
we will not discard, as is typically done, the measurement
outcomes when A and B’s choice of basis do not agree).
Our results show that, if we assume E’s attack is symmetric
(which could even be enforced), then the three state protocol’s
maximally tolerated error rate is equal to that of the four-state
BB84 protocol - i.e., our key rate bound (which will be a
function only of parameters that may be observed by A and
B) remains positive up to an error rate of 11%. We will also
consider how the choice of |a〉 affects this rate.
In [7], mismatched measurement bases were also used to
show this three-state protocol’s key rate was equal to that of
the full four-state BB84. However, in this paper, we provide
an alternative proof of this result using different methods. The
technique we derive here may be easily extended to other QKD
protocols. We also discuss the choice of α.
Also, mismatched measurement outcomes were used in [6]
with the BB84 (a four-state protocol) and the six-state BB84
protocols; it was also shown to produce a superior key rate
for certain quantum channels, for those two protocols. In [8]
they were used to detect an attacker with greater probability
for measure/resend attacks. We also used them in [9] in the
proof of security for a semi-quantum QKD protocol.
For notation, we denote by ρAB to mean a density operator
acting on the joint Hilbert space HA ⊗ HB . If we write
ρA then we mean the operator resulting from the tracing
out of B’s subspace (i.e., ρA = trBρAB). These definitions
extend to three or more subspaces. By S(AB)ρ we mean
the von Neumann entropy S(ρAB) and S(A|B)ρ to mean
S(AB)ρ − S(B)ρ. We use H(·) to denote the classical
Shannon entropy and h(x) to be the binary entropy function
(i.e., h(x) = H(x, 1 − x) = −x log x − (1 − x) log(1 − x)).
All logarithms in this paper are base two.
II. THE PROTOCOL
The protocol we consider in this paper is a three state one
and it is a generalization of the protocol described in [3],
[4]. Let B = {|0〉 , |1〉} be an arbitrary orthonormal basis
and let A = {|a〉 , |a¯〉}, where |a〉 = α |0〉 + √1− α2 |1〉,
|a¯〉 = √1− α2 |0〉 − α |1〉, and α ∈ (0, 1). Clearly A is also
an orthonormal basis; note that when α = 1/
√
2, we have
|a〉 = |+〉 and |a¯〉 = |−〉 where |±〉 = 1/√2(|0〉 ± |1〉). The
value of α is considered to be public knowledge.
The quantum communication stage of the protocol consists
of the following process:
ar
X
iv
:1
60
1.
00
18
5v
2 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
3 J
un
 20
16
1) A prepares a qubit of the form |0〉, |1〉, or |a〉, choosing
each with probability p/2, p/2, and 1 − p respectively.
This qubit is sent to B. Note that A cannot prepare |a¯〉.
2) B chooses with probability q to measure the qubit in
the B = {|0〉 , |1〉} basis; otherwise, he measures in the
A = {|a〉 , |a¯〉} basis.
3) A and B will disclose their choice of basis (using an
authenticated classical channel). If their choice of basis
is B, they will use this iteration to contribute towards
their raw key in the obvious way.
Note that, when α = 1/
√
2, this protocol is exactly the
three-state version of BB84 discussed in [3], [4]; that is, it
is BB84 with the limitation that A can never send |−〉 and
thus the users can never measure the probability of E’s attack
flipping a |−〉 to a |+〉 (they can only measure the probability
of a |+〉 flipping to a |−〉). As discussed in [3], there are
several potential practical benefits to this protocol. It is also
interesting theoretically as it allows us to study the effects of
decreasing A’s required quantum capabilities.
III. SECURITY PROOF
To compute a lower bound on the key rate r, we must first
describe the quantum system after one iteration of the protocol,
conditioning on the event this iteration is used to contribute
towards the raw key (in particular, A sends a state from B and
B measures in that same basis). We will first assume collective
attacks; later we will comment on general attacks.
Fix α ∈ (0, 1); this parameter is public knowledge (in par-
ticular E also knows the value this is set to) and furthermore,
once fixed it is constant throughout the protocol. Let U be
the unitary attack operator E employs each iteration of the
protocol. Since we are conditioning on the event this iteration
is used to contribute to the raw key, A will prepare |0〉 or |1〉,
choosing each with probability 1/2. E will then attack with
operator U . Without loss of generality, we may assume E’s
ancilla is cleared to some |0〉E state and so write U ’s action
on basis states as follows:
U |0, 0〉 = |0, e0〉+ |1, e1〉 , U |1, 0〉 = |0, e2〉+ |1, e3〉 (1)
These |ei〉 are arbitrary states in E’s ancilla and are not
assumed to be normalized nor orthogonal. Unitarity of U
of course imposes certain conditions on them; furthermore,
parameter estimation will yield even more data on them later.
Thus, the state of the quantum system, when the qubit
arrives at B’s lab is: 12 |0〉 〈0|A ⊗ P (|0, e0〉 + |1, e1〉) +
1
2 |1〉 〈1|A ⊗ P (|0, e2〉 + |1, e3〉), where P (z) = zz∗ and z∗
is the conjugate transpose of z.
B will then measure in the B basis (again, we are condi-
tioning on the event this iteration is used for the raw key)
yielding the final quantum state:
1
2
|00〉 〈00|AB ⊗ |e0〉 〈e0|+
1
2
|11〉 〈11|AB ⊗ |e3〉 〈e3|
+
1
2
|01〉 〈01|AB ⊗ |e1〉 〈e1|+
1
2
|10〉 〈10|AB ⊗ |e2〉 〈e2|
Call this state χABE . We will make the usual assumption that
the noise in the B basis, induced by E’s attack, is symmetric:
that is 〈e0|e0〉 = 〈e3|e3〉 = 1−Q and 〈e1|e1〉 = 〈e2|e2〉 = Q.
These parameters 〈ei|ei〉 can obviously be estimated by A and
B; thus this symmetry condition can even be enforced. Note
that, without this assumption, our analysis could still be carried
out, though the algebra is not as amiable.
Assume, for the moment, that Q > 0 (we will consider the
case Q = 0 later). Tracing out B, we may write χABE as:
χAE = (1−Q)ρAE +QσAE , (2)
where:
ρAE =
1
2
|0〉 〈0|A ⊗
|e0〉 〈e0|
1−Q +
1
2
|1〉 〈1|A ⊗
|e3〉 〈e3|
1−Q (3)
σAE =
1
2
|0〉 〈0|A ⊗
|e1〉 〈e1|
Q
+
1
2
|1〉 〈1|A ⊗
|e2〉 〈e2|
Q
. (4)
It is obvious that both ρAE and σAE are Hermitian semi-
definite operators of unit trace. Before continuing, we require
two lemmas which, though trivial to prove, we include for
completeness:
Lemma 1. Given a finite dimensional Hilbert space H =
HC ⊗HE , let {|1〉C , · · · , |n〉C} be an orthonormal basis of
HC . Consider the following density operator:
ρ =
n∑
i=1
pi |i〉 〈i|C ⊗ σ(i)E ,
where
∑
pi = 1, pi ≥ 0, and each σ(i)E is a Hermitian positive
semi-definite operator of unit trace acting on HE . Then:
S(ρ) = H(p1, · · · , pn) +
n∑
i=1
piS
(
σ
(i)
E
)
.
Proof: See [10] for a proof.
Lemma 2. Given a finite dimensional Hilbert space H =
HA ⊗HE and the following density operators:
ρAE = p0 |0〉 〈0|A ⊗ ρ0E + p1 |1〉 〈1|A ⊗ ρ1E
σAE = q0 |0〉 〈0|A ⊗ σ0E + q1 |1〉 〈1|A ⊗ σ1E
χAE = pρρAE + pσσAE ,
then the following is true:
S(A|E)χ ≥ pρS(A|E)ρ + pσS(A|E)σ (5)
Proof: Let HC be the two dimensional Hilbert space
spanned by orthonormal basis {|X〉 , |Y 〉} and let χAEC be
the following density operator:
χAEC = pρ |X〉 〈X| ⊗ ρAE + pσ |Y 〉 〈Y | ⊗ σAE ,
which acts onHA⊗HE⊗HC . Observe that trCχAEC = χAE .
Due to the strong sub additivity of von Neumann entropy, it
holds that: S(A|E)χ ≥ S(A|EC)χ. We will show that:
S(A|EC)χ = pρS(A|E)ρ + pσS(A|E)σ, (6)
from which Equation 5 will follow. Of course S(A|EC)χ =
S(AEC)χ − S(EC)χ. Applying Lemma 1 twice, we have:
S(AEC)χ = h(pρ) + pρS(AE)ρ + pσS(AE)σ
S(EC)χ = h(pρ) + pρS(E)ρ + pσS(E)σ.
Thus:
S(A|EC)χ = S(AEC)χ − S(EC)χ
= pρ(S(AE)ρ − S(E)ρ)
+ pσ(S(AE)σ − S(E)σ)
= pρS(A|E)ρ + pσS(A|E)σ.
Thus, from Lemma 2, we may compute a lower bound on
S(A|E)χ (and thus a lower bound on the key rate r). This is:
S(A|E)χ ≥ (1−Q) · S(A|E)ρ +Q · S(A|E)σ.
We need now only compute the conditional entropy of the
operators ρAE and σAE individually. It is clear that:
S(AE)ρ = S(AE)σ = h(1/2) = 1.
Now, tracing out A, yields:
ρE =
1
2(1−Q) (|e0〉 〈e0|+ |e3〉 〈e3|) (7)
σE =
1
2Q
(|e1〉 〈e1|+ |e2〉 〈e2|). (8)
We must now compute S(E)ρ and S(E)σ . To do so, we
will need the eigenvalues of these two density operators. First
consider ρE . Without loss of generality, we may write:
|e0〉 = z |E〉 , |e3〉 = heiθ |E〉+ d |I〉 , (9)
where z, h, d ∈ R, 〈E|E〉 = 〈I|I〉 = 1, and 〈E|I〉 = 0.
Furthermore, we have the following:
z2 = h2 + d2 = 1−Q (10)
hzeiθ = 〈e0|e3〉 ⇒ h2z2 = | 〈e0|e3〉 |2. (11)
In this {|E〉 , |I〉} basis, we may write ρE as:
ρE =
1
2(1−Q)
 z2 + h2 heiθd
he−iθd d2
 ,
the eigenvalues of which are readily computed to be:
λρ± =
1
2
±
√
(z2 + h2 − d2)2 + 4h2d2
4(1−Q)
Using identities 10 and 11, we have:
λρ± =
1
2
±
√
4h4 + 4h2(z2 − h2)
4(1−Q)
=
1
2
±
√
h2z2
2(1−Q) =
1
2
± | 〈e0|e3〉 |
2(1−Q) . (12)
Similarly, we may compute the eigenvalues of the two-
dimensional operator σE as:
λσ± =
1
2
± | 〈e1|e2〉 |
2Q
. (13)
(We are still assuming, for now, Q > 0.)
Thus, S(E)ρ = h(λ
ρ
+) and S(E)σ = h(λ
σ
+), and so:
S(A|E)χ ≥ (1−Q)(1− h(λρ+)) +Q(1− h(λσ+))
≥ 1− (1−Q) · h(λρ+)−Q · h(λσ+).
It is trivial to show that H(A|B) = h(Q). Thus, the key
rate of this three-state protocol is lower bounded by:
r = S(A|E)χ −H(A|B)
≥ 1− (1−Q) · h(λρ+)−Q · h(λσ+)− h(Q).
Note that, if Q = 0, then |e1〉 ≡ |e2〉 ≡ 0 and so these terms
never show up in Equation 2. In this case, we may define λσ+
arbitrarily and the above key rate bound will still hold.
Therefore, to determine the key rate, A and B must esti-
mate the quantities | 〈e0|e3〉 | and | 〈e1|e2〉 |. These cannot be
directly observed; however, by using the error rate in the A
basis, along with mismatched measurement results, they may
determine bounds on these two quantities. Before discussing
how this is done, however, we mention one last critical detail.
Note that λρ+ and λ
σ
+ are both greater than, or equal to, 1/2.
Note also that the binary entropy function h(x) attains its
maximum when x = 1/2 and on the interval [1/2, 1] it is a
decreasing function. Thus, if we find values λρ and λσ , such
that 1/2 ≤ λρ ≤ λρ+ and 1/2 ≤ λσ ≤ λσ+, then it will hold
that h(λρ+) ≤ h(λρ) (and similarly for σ). Thus, we have:
r ≥ 1− (1−Q) · h(λρ+)−Q · h(λσ+)− h(Q)
≥ 1− (1−Q) · h(λρ)−Q · h(λσ)− h(Q). (14)
We will soon see that it is easier to bound the real parts of
〈e0|e3〉 and 〈e1|e2〉. Therefore, we will define:
λρ =
1
2
+
|Re 〈e0|e3〉 |
2(1−Q) ≥
1
2
, λσ =
1
2
+
|Re 〈e1|e2〉 |
2Q
≥ 1
2
(the same discussion before concerning the case when Q = 0
applies). It is clear that:
λρ+ =
1
2
+
| 〈e0|e3〉 |
2(1−Q) =
1
2
+
√
Re2 〈e0|e3〉+ Im2 〈e0|e3〉
2(1−Q)
≥ 1
2
+
√
Re2 〈e0|e3〉
2(1−Q) = λ
ρ ≥ 1
2
,
and similarly, λσ+ ≥ λσ ≥ 1/2. To evaluate our key rate bound
in Equation 14, we therefore need to determine bounds on the
real part only of 〈e0|e3〉 and 〈e1|e2〉.
A. Parameter Estimation
To estimate Re 〈e0|e3〉 and Re 〈e1|e2〉, we will consider,
first, the noise in the A basis. To improve this bound, we
will also consider measurement results from mismatched bases
(results which are typically discarded). Before, continuing, let
us introduce some notation. In particular, we will denote by
Ri,j to mean Re 〈ei|ej〉 (for i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. By px,y we
mean the probability that if A sends |x〉 (for x ∈ {0, 1, a}),
then, after E’s attack, B measures |y〉 (for y ∈ {0, 1, a, a¯}).
For instance, p0,1 = 〈e1|e1〉 = Q. Finally, let β =
√
1− α2
(and so |a〉 = α |0〉+ β |1〉).
Now, consider the quantity pa,a¯ which, to avoid confusion
with pa,a, we will also denote QA. This represents the error
in the A basis (note that, unlike in a four-state protocol, A
and B cannot directly measure pa¯,a). By linearity of U , we
have (see Equation 1):
U |a〉 = |0〉 (α |e0〉+ β |e2〉) + |1〉 (α |e1〉+ β |e3〉) (15)
= |a〉 (α2 |e0〉+ αβ |e2〉+ αβ |e1〉+ β2 |e3〉)
+ |a¯〉 (βα |e0〉+ β2 |e2〉 − α2 |e1〉 − αβ |e3〉).
Thus:
QA = α2β2(〈e0|e0〉+ 〈e3|e3〉) + β4 〈e2|e2〉+ α4 〈e1|e1〉
+ 2Re(β3α 〈e0|e2〉 − βα3 〈e0|e1〉 − α2β2 〈e0|e3〉
− α2β2 〈e1|e2〉 − αβ3 〈e2|e3〉+ α3β 〈e1|e3〉). (16)
Of course, α (and thus β) are public knowledge; also the
quantities 〈ei|ei〉 can be estimated using the B-basis noise.
That leaves: R0,2,R0,1,R0,3,R1,2,R2,3,R1,3. Most of these,
however, may be estimated using mismatched measurement
results. Consider the quantity p0,a. This is a value that would
ordinarily be discarded as A and B used different bases; yet,
this probability, which can be estimated by A and B, will lead
to an estimate of R0,1. Indeed:
U |0〉 = |0, e0〉+ |1, e1〉
= |a〉 (α |e0〉+ β |e1〉) + |a¯〉 (βe0 − α |e1〉),
and so:
p0,a = α
2 〈e0|e0〉+ β2 〈e1|e1〉+ 2αβR0,1
⇒R0,1 = p0,a − α
2(1−Q)− β2Q
2αβ
. (17)
On observing Q, along with p0,a, A and B immediately may
estimate R0,1. Similarly, they may use p1,a to estimate R2,3:
R2,3 = p1,a − α
2Q− β2(1−Q)
2αβ
. (18)
When α = 1/
√
2 (as dictated by the original three-state
protocol [3], [4]), A and B need not estimate R0,2 and
R1,3 due to the fact that unitarity of U (which imposes the
condition R0,2 = −R1,3) will force the terms to cancel in
Equation 16. For other values of α, however, an estimate will
be necessary and it may be accomplished by considering pa,0.
From Equation 15 this is:
pa,0 = α
2 〈e0|e0〉+ β2 〈e2|e2〉+ 2αβR0,2
⇒R0,2 = pa,0 − α
2(1−Q)− β2Q
2αβ
. (19)
Since unitarity of U forces the relation R1,3 = −R0,2, A and
B now have estimates of all quantities in Equation 16 except
Fig. 1: Comparing our new key rate bound (for any α ∈ (0, 1))
with the one from [4] (which did not use mismatched mea-
surement outcomes).
for R0,3 and R1,2. However, the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality
forces R1,2 ∈ [−Q,Q]. This, combined with Equation 16,
allow the users to bound R0,3 and thus evaluate r (one must
simply find the minimum r over all R1,2 ∈ [−Q,Q]). For our
evaluations, we performed this optimization numerically; how-
ever finding an analytic solution would be straight-forward.
Finally, as the protocol is permutation invariant, the results
of [11], [12] apply and thus our key rate bound holds even
against the most general of attacks (not only collective).
B. Evaluation
To evaluate our key rate bound, we will first consider the
case that E’s attack is symmetric in that it may be modeled as a
depolarization channel (this is a common assumption in QKD
protocol security proofs; in fact, it could even be enforced by
the users). Consider a depolarization channel with parameter
Q: EQ(ρ) = (1− 2Q)ρ+QI where I is the two-dimensional
identity operator. Then, if A sends |i〉 ∈ B, the probability of
measuring |1− i〉 is Q as desired. Thus 〈e1|e1〉 = 〈e2|e2〉 =
Q. Furthermore, if A sends |0〉, then the qubit’s state when it
arrives at B’s lab is:
EQ(|0〉 〈0|) = (1− 2Q) |0〉 〈0|+Q(|0〉 〈0|+ |1〉 〈1|),
and so we have p0,a = (1−2Q)α2+Q (note that if α = 1/
√
2
and thus |a〉 = |+〉, we have p0,+ = 1/2 as expected). Using
this value in Equation 17 yields:
R0,1 = (1− 2Q)α
2 +Q− α2(1−Q)− β2Q
2αβ
=
α2 − 2α2Q+Q− α2 + α2Q− (1− α2)Q
2αβ
= 0.
Similarly, we find R2,3 = 0.
If α = 1/
√
2, we are done; otherwise, we must consider
pa,0. If A sends |a〉, then the qubit arriving at B’s lab is:
EQ(|a〉 〈a|) = (1− 2Q) |a〉 〈a|+Q(|a〉 〈a|+ |a¯〉 〈a¯|), (20)
from which it is clear that pa,0 = (1−2Q)α2+Q. Substituting
into Equation 19 we find that R0,2 = 0. Thus also R1,3 =
−R0,2 = 0.
Substituting this into Equation 16 and solving for R0,3
yields the expression:
R0,3 = 2α
2β2(1−Q) + (β4 + α4)Q−QA − 2α2β2R1,2
2α2β2
= 1− 2Q+ Q−QA
2α2β2
−R1,2, (21)
where, above, we used the fact that: 1 = (α2 + β2)2 = α4 +
2α2β2 + β4 ⇒ α4 + β4 = 1− 2α2β2.
Finally, from Equation 20, we find QA = Q and so: R0,3 =
1 − 2Q − R1,2. Note that, under this (entirely enforceable)
assumption of a depolarization channel, the parameters α and
β do not show up in the above expression; they therefore do
not appear in the evaluation of r. Thus, in this symmetric
case, the value of α is irrelevant (at least in the perfect qubit,
asymptotic scenario - we make no claims about its relevance in
more practical scenarios; it also is relevant in non-symmetric
scenarios as we soon show).
To evaluate the key rate r, we must now simply minimize
r over all R1,2 ∈ [−Q,Q]. We performed this computation
numerically, resulting in the key rate shown in Figure 1. Notice
that the key rate is positive for all Q ≤ 11%; this is exactly the
tolerance supported by the four state BB84 protocol. Compare
this with the lower-bound from [4] which did not make use
of mismatched measurement bases and which only remained
positive for Q ≤ 5.1%. In fact, we found that, in this symmet-
ric case, our new key rate bound agrees exactly with that of
the four-state BB84 protocol 1−h(Q)−h(QX) = 1−2h(Q)
where QX is the error in the X ({|±〉}) basis [2]. Furthermore,
this is true for any α ∈ (0, 1). This provides an alternative
proof to the result from [7].
While α does not appear when E’s attack is symmetric;
this of course is not true in other cases. We considered the
effect of various settings for α when QA = 2Q (Figure 2
(a)) and QA = Q/2 (Figure 2 (b)); we also plotted the old
key rate bound from [4] for comparison. In Figure 2 (c) and
(d) we considered the case when pa,0 and p1,a are such that
R0,2 and R2,3 are non-zero. As α is a parameter that must
be set before the protocol runs, it seems α = 1/
√
2 is a good
compromise (other settings can do better or worse depending
on the attack used).
IV. CLOSING REMARKS
We have derived a new proof of security and key-rate bound
for a three state BB84 protocol - a protocol where A sends
only |0〉, |1〉, or |a〉 = α |0〉 + √1− α2 |1〉. Furthermore we
have shown that this new key rate bound, in addition to the
use of mismatched measurement outcomes, can tolerate the
same maximal noise level as the four state BB84 (i.e., the key
rate is positive for all Q ≤ 11%) in the asymptotic scenario.
The technique we used in our proof - especially our use of
mismatched measurement outcomes in this manner to estimate
Ri,j despite the lack of the statistic pa¯,a - may hold application
in the analysis of other QKD protocols where one (or both)
party is limited. This is a subject we intend to investigate in
the near future.
(a) QA = 2Q (b) QA = Q/2
(c) R0,2 = −
√
Q(1−Q) (d) R2,3 =
√
Q(1−Q)
Fig. 2: Showing how α2 affects the key rate in various noise
scenarios. Also comparing with the “Old” bound from [4] in
(a) and (b). (a): when QA = 2Q. (b): when the A noise is half.
(c): When the noise in both bases are equal, but pa,0 is such
that R0,2 = −
√
Q(1−Q) (the largest negative it could be).
(d): Like (c), but now R2,3 =
√
Q(1−Q) (while R0,2 = 0).
REFERENCES
[1] Valerio Scarani, Helle Bechmann-Pasquinucci, Nicolas J. Cerf, Miloslav
Dusˇek, Norbert Lu¨tkenhaus, and Momtchil Peev. The security of
practical quantum key distribution. Rev. Mod. Phys., 81:1301–1350,
Sep 2009.
[2] Renato Renner, Nicolas Gisin, and Barbara Kraus. Information-theoretic
security proof for quantum-key-distribution protocols. Phys. Rev. A,
72:012332, Jul 2005.
[3] Chi-Hang Fred Fung and Hoi-Kwong Lo. Security proof of a three-state
quantum-key-distribution protocol without rotational symmetry. Phys.
Rev. A, 74:042342, Oct 2006.
[4] Cyril Branciard, Nicolas Gisin, Norbert Lutkenhaus, and Valerio Scarani.
Zero-error attacks and detection statistics in the coherent one-way pro-
tocol for quantum cryptography. Quantum Information & Computation,
7(7):639–664, 2007.
[5] Charles H Bennett and Gilles Brassard. Quantum cryptography: Public
key distribution and coin tossing. In Proceedings of IEEE International
Conference on Computers, Systems and Signal Processing, volume 175.
New York, 1984.
[6] Shun Watanabe, Ryutaroh Matsumoto, and Tomohiko Uyematsu. To-
mography increases key rates of quantum-key-distribution protocols.
Physical Review A, 78(4):042316, 2008.
[7] Kiyoshi Tamaki, Marcos Curty, Go Kato, Hoi-Kwong Lo, and Koji
Azuma. Loss-tolerant quantum cryptography with imperfect sources.
Physical Review A, 90(5):052314, 2014.
[8] Stephen M Barnett, Bruno Huttner, and Simon JD Phoenix. Eaves-
dropping strategies and rejected-data protocols in quantum cryptography.
Journal of Modern Optics, 40(12):2501–2513, 1993.
[9] Walter O Krawec. Security of a semi-quantum protocol where reflec-
tions contribute to the secret key. To appear: Quantum Information
Processing. arXiv:1510.07181, 2016.
[10] Walter O. Krawec. Security proof of a semi-quantum key distribution
protocol. In Information Theory (ISIT), 2015 IEEE International
Symposium on, pages 686–690, June 2015.
[11] Matthias Christandl, Robert Konig, and Renato Renner. Postselection
technique for quantum channels with applications to quantum cryptog-
raphy. Phys. Rev. Lett., 102:020504, Jan 2009.
[12] Renato Renner. Symmetry of large physical systems implies indepen-
dence of subsystems. Nature Physics, 3(9):645–649, 2007.
